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FOREWORD
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation
of five new states in Central Asia. These states: Kazkahstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have become
both the object of international rivalries in Central Asia and
the sources of new political forces as they act to enlarge their
independence in world politics. This monograph attempts to trace
the importance of the new forces unleashed by the advent of these
states by focusing on the struggle around energy and security
issues involving them.
These issues will have significant impact upon the security
of the Middle East; the Commonwealth of Independent States,
especially Russia; South Asia; and even China. Already the
impact of these new states is making itself felt in international
politics in these regions.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
report as a contribution to greater understanding of Central
Asian issues whose significance in world politics can only grow.
William W. Allen
Colonel U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has been an Associate Professor of
Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since
1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate
Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace
Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell
Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian
history from the University of Chicago. He has published
numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign
policies, notably in the Third World, and is the author of a
recent study of the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities and
editor of a book on the future of the Soviet military.

iv

SUMMARY
Five Central Asian states emerged out of the Soviet Union's
Central Asian republics in 1991. Although U.S. policymakers
presumed that Iran would inevitably sweep them into its sphere of
influence, this has not happened. Nor is it likely to occur.
Instead there has developed a multi-state competition for
influence and even control of these new states. This competition
involves Russia as the leading force in the area and Moscow's
main rivals are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan (and India), China, and
the United States. This rivalry is particularly strong in the
struggle among these states to gain positions of leverage over
the energy economy, i.e. production, pipelines, and refining in
Central Asia because this region is blessed with enormous energy
deposits. These deposits are crucial to Central Asia's
integration with the world economy and economic progress.
Indeed, energy exports may be the only way these governments can
hope for any economic stability and progress in the future.
Therefore, whoever controls the energy economy will
determine the destiny of the region. This monograph offers a
detailed look at how and why Russia is trying to control that
economy and thus the destiny of these states, as well as the
strategies of its rivals. Moscow is aiming to reintegrate
Central Asia into an economic, political, and ultimately military
union with Russia. It is trying to dominate their economies and
subject them to Muscovite direction. Russia, therefore, resorts
to blocking energy production, hindering foreign firms'
activities in Central Asia, obstructing exports, and conducting
currency policies that export inflation. Russia also has devised
policies that coerce Central Asian states into giving Russians
residing there dual citizenship. All of these policies signify
Russia's efforts to fashion a new model of economic and, hence,
military-political hegemony over the region and a new form of
Central Asia's colonial dependency upon Moscow. The monograph
argues that though Moscow is conducting a strong policy, it is
not ultimately able to achieve such control because Central Asian
states have alternatives in other states and because of Russia's
own economic weakness.
Presently, none of Russia's other rivals for influence in
Central Asia are able alone to check Russia's renewed imperial
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thrust. Should they combine their efforts, an option that has
some limited possibility of fruition, they might achieve
something in the way of lasting positions of leverage over
Central Asia. But China is likely to be an exception to that
general trend. China, arguably, is driven by compelling energy
and political needs of keeping its own Muslims docile to expand
its economic and political influence into Central Asia. Although
for now cooperation with Russia is a greater priority for China,
in the longer term there are significant possibilities for China
to become Russia's main rival in Central Asia. These conclusions
derive from a detailed examination of the role Central Asia plays
in the international policies of Turkey, Iran, India-Pakistan,
and China. In all these cases, energy and transportation, as
well as the Islamic factor, figure prominently in efforts to gain
leverage. However, detailed examination of their policies
suggests that if Moscow's rivals act alone, except for China,
they cannot save Central Asia from Russia.
Implicitly, however, a second factor is operating that will
make any Russian effort to reimpose empire difficult. Russia's
own economic situation will not permit it to use its economic
power to lift up and modernize Central Asia. Rather Central Asia
will remain trapped in an inequitable division of labor and
backwardness, not to mention authoritarianism, that will not lead
to internal stability. Indeed, quite the opposite will be the
result if Russian imperial policies prevail. Therefore the
monograph argues that the U.S. policy that has essentially
accepted Russian policies here is mistaken. If we want to foster
conditions of economic growth, democratic progress, and global
integration, we should promote policies that open Central Asia to
foreign investment and economic growth. We should not consign
the region to a Moscow-directed integration that leaves it as the
backward raw materials periphery of a stalled Russian economy.
That policy can only lead to further instabilities and conflicts
in the area which will then increasingly bring all of the rivals
into the conflict zone. Such an outcome conforms neither to
Central Asia's interests nor to those of the great powers which
contend for influence there. In that case regional economic and
political rivalry could become an intractable international
military rivalry.
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ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA:
RUSSIA AND ITS RIVALS

Introduction.
Five new states emerged in Central Asia when the Soviet
Union collapsed. They are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrygzstan,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Then Secretary of State James
Baker and many U.S. pundits expected these largely Muslim
republics to fall soon to Iranian or fundamentalist influence.
This view stemmed from a superficial wrongheaded reading of the
1
area. Instead, a complex, multi-state rivalry to influence and
control Central Asia's destiny, trade, and resources, especially
Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's oil and gas, has developed. The
main players are Russia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, China,
and the United States. Israel and Saudi Arabia play a lesser
2
role.
Russia's sustained effort to subordinate Central Asia to its
policies is the most strongly perceived aspect of this rivalry.
However, Central Asian states are not helpless before foreign
machinations. The earlier view about the imminence of Iranian
takeover that U.S. policymakers had postulated has not been borne
out by events. Rather, Central Asian states are enhancing their
3
ability to deal freely with Russia's rivals. Since Moscow openly
employs economic pressure and a coercive energy policy to compel
Central Asian reintegration with Russia, those sectors figure
most prominently in this rivalry, whose outcome has vital
consequences for both regional as well as Russian security.
All the rival states' influence over Central Asia affects
important, often vital interests. For example, Israel aimed to
divert Central Asian states from pro-Iranian policies, prove its
bona fides in the Muslim world, and prevent nuclear proliferation
4
from Kazakhstan to other Muslim states.
In the future U.S.
interests here could become vital if Russia or China enters local
conflicts. But to best understand what is now taking place in
this rivalry the focus should be on the international struggle
over Central Asian energy resources. This struggle takes place
in the broader context of the rivals' efforts to influence
Central Asia's economic and political global integration.
Focusing on the rivals' economic policies, especially in energy,
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clarifies that context and this rivalry.
Energy as the Crucial Sector.
The enormous energy resources of Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan are vital to their economic and political future.
For all three states energy exports are the main, if not only,
path to the world economy and vital resources for future
5
investment and growth.
That is also true for China, Iran, and
Turkey, if not India and Pakistan. Energy producers' competition
for markets is a major factor of security policies.
The struggle to control energy resources, the pipelines
through which they travel, and trade routes is widely regarded as
a new form of the pre-1945 Great Game between the Russian and
British empires in Central Asia. Already Central Asian efforts to
act independently in their foreign economic policies have led to
Russian acts of economic warfare. Russian policies regarding
Central Asian economic and energy issues reject the notion of a
benign threat assessment in the CIS' energy producing areas.
Thus in energy and economic policies no quarter is given or
asked. Rather Russia reacts hyper-sensitively to any sign of
Central Asian self-assertion and sees foreign threats everywhere.
Moscow's actions show that it rejects the belief that,
If carefully articulated, Russian interests will find
broad support because few people have any great
interests in generating more 'great games' between East
6
and West or between North and South.
Instead Russian actions demonstrate that this view is as
unfounded and naive as the earlier belief about imminent
fundamentalism. Russian threat perceptions impel Moscow to
transcend reintegration on mutually agreed upon bases and resort
to outright coercion and efforts to restore a neo-colonialist
relationship of dependency upon Moscow. That coercion does not
aim at immediate and total integration which is presently beyond
Russia. Rather, Russia is creating conditions for future
integration based on what it can afford and control now. Moscow
can control energy since its pipelines and refinery capabilities
enable it to shut off energy to and from Central Asia.
Moscow began using energy to compel Ukraine, the Baltic
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states and Belarus into submission when Gorbachev tried to hold
7
In 1989-91 he habitually threatened to cut
the USSR together.
off energy supplies to these rebellious states. Though some
predicted that the Soviet collapse would also trigger Russia's
and Central Asia's collapse, Russia aims to reintegrate the
Soviet 'economic space' on a Moscow-centric basis using energy
8
coercion as a key lever.
But its efforts to control energy
production and shipments stimulate this rivalry among other
producers, international oil companies, and states who would be
energy consumers.
Russia also desires the lucrative benefits accruing to key
players in the world energy business. Thus it restricts Central
Asian states' exports, and redirects energy trade flows to it and
its transport network. There also is at least some official
9
Russian interest in OPEC.
In April 1994, Russian Energy
Minister Yuri Shafranik stated a wish to further oil cooperation
10
with Iran.
This coincided with reports of Moscow's desire to
ease the embargo against Iraq. Analysts, like Valerii Lipitskii,
argue that Arab states should invest in Russian oil to prevent a
Western "takeover" of the oil and OPEC's ensuing decline. They
11
also urge the Arabs to buy Russian arms.
Therefore, a deal with
Iraq or OPEC may be brewing even as Russian pressure upon other
CIS states' energy resources grows. That would strike at the
U.S. policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran.
In its 1994 Russian National Security Concept, the journal
Obozrevatel'-Observer stated that the entire current security
agenda boiled down to two linked issues: supplying Russian fuel
and raw materials to other members of the CIS, and Russian
troops' combat role in conflicts within the former Soviet
12
borders.
This observation dramatized the importance of Russia's
control over Central Asian energy by linking it to Russia's
military operations in the CIS. This report (for that is the
form this "Concept" took) also thereby highlighted the centrality
of energy issues for Russia vis-a-vis Central Asia. The concept
statement also noted CIS members' growing dependence on restoring
foreign trade with Russia, especially in energy. This dependence
would now make it possible for Russia to regain its influence
over Central Asia through further integration with the world
economy. Russia had subsidized CIS energy use for years through
1993, with almost no reward. Instead, as the price of the
influence which subsidies brought to Moscow, Russia had accepted
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massive economic losses and diverted its vital foreign trade away
from customers paying market prices. Thus, to regain that
foreign trade and to force Central Asia into further dependence
on the Russian economy, Obozrevatel'-Observer argued that Russia
13
must charge world market prices and end the subsidies.
Meanwhile Russia's energy industry faces collapse, declining
production, under-investment, and massive state arrears. The
worst outcome for the industry and Russia is the emergence of new
Western-backed competitors in its non-paying customers' lands.
Russia's previous subsidies supposedly prove its benevolence
towards those customers, but cannot be sustained. Therefore,
Russia insists other states pose an energy threat.
But Russian coercion obliges Central Asia to reply in kind
even though it is landlocked and far from major world trade
routes. To trade abroad freely, they must invest massively in
transportation and infrastructure. Those sums are beyond them
and existing transportation systems all traverse Russia since
Soviet planners promoted regional dependence on Moscow. Because
Central Asia, as a whole, also faces desperate and worsening
economic, demographic, and ecological problems, investment in
14
transportation and infrastructure must be foreign.
Only oil
revenues, or their prospect, can finance the investments needed
to modernize and diversify local economies. Otherwise, Central
Asia must rely on Russian transport and refineries for oil. This
would be a disaster since control over transportation is a
15
Whoever controls trade
precondition to control of Central Asia.
and pipeline routes will decide the region's destiny.
Accordingly, Russia's energy policies particularly endanger
Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan. Russia "blackmails" Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan over energy exploration and transhipment and
16
holds them "hostage."
Western observers also note Russia's
17
"proprietary attitude" towards local oil deposits.
Still more
dangerous is past Russian policy towards Azerbaidzhan. Russia
coerced Baku into granting Lukoil, Russia's oil company, a 10
percent share of revenues from future Caspian Sea oil finds
without Lukoil putting up a kopek of equity. Russia also tried
to prevent Western investors, led by a British Petroleum
18
consortium, from operating there.
On April 28, 1994, the
Russian government sent London a demarche claiming a right to
veto any exploration in the Caspian Sea, and that oil projects in
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the Caspian Sea "cannot be recognized" without Russian approval.
It thus threatened Azerbaidzhan's oil projects and the ChevronTengiz and Caspishelf projects in Kazakhstan (led by Mobil, BP,
19
The letter
British Gas, Agip, Statoil, Total, and Shell).
states:
The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir and an
object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues
or activities including resource development must be
resolved by all the Caspian countries. Any unilateral
20
actions lack a legal basis.
This letter is instructive in several regards. It asserts
Russia's preemptive rights over Caspian energy ventures (and
21
Thus the
implicitly over all energy ventures in the CIS).
letter confirms Russia's belief in its proprietary and imperial
22
rights across the CIS over energy.
Its timing and address to
London also suggest Russia's determination to extrude Western
investment and influence from CIS oil producing states.
The demarche's blunt tone, and address to London, not Baku,
also suggests that Russia sees this as an East-West issue. The
destination shows Moscow's disdain for Azerbaidzhan's or other
littoral states' sovereignty. If London or the West yields,
Moscow seems to believe, so will Baku. Evidently the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and other high officials assume that if the
Azeris and other littoral states are not dominated by Russia they
will implicitly revert to an anti-Russian Western sphere of
influence. This principle underpinned Soviet policies, and much
of Tsarist thinking as well. Therefore this letter displays a
continuing Brezhnev-like doctrine of diminished sovereignty for
other CIS members and mafia-like tactics of threatening that bad
things will happen unless Russia gets its percentage. Although
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin denied knowledge of this
letter, once it was published abroad Russia's press reiterated
23
its arguments and threat assessments.
However, by this demarche Russia has had to come out into
the open. The use of such spurious arguments to deny states their
territorial waters and sovereignty with no basis in fact or
international law evokes past Soviet brazenness. It also shows
Moscow's weakness, frustration, and desperation over its eroding
imperial position. The letter's menacing tone actually reflects
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Russia's awareness that Baku and the West were about to resist
its pressure successfully. It may be the opening shot in a
campaign, but the campaign is born of weakness, not strength.
Thus Western and local resistance to imperial claims safeguards
Central Asia's independence. Azerbaidzhan will not fall into
Russian hands if its diplomacy remains wily and resolute, and if
24
the West supports it.
Given time and wise local policies, such
resistance could cancel any one power's overwhelming local
hegemony. While that is a demanding condition for local and
foreign statesmen, it is hardly an impossible one.
Russian Economic and Energy Policies.
Russia does not hide its ultimate objective: to compel
Central Asian reintegration on Moscow's terms, mainly by using
economic means. Though the Russian forces deployed in
Tadzhikistan's civil war give Moscow a military entree into the
region, economic and political forces are Russia's most effective
policy tools. For Russian elites economic factors objectively
impel reintegration of the CIS. President Yeltsin and Premier
Viktor Chernomyrdin have reiterated that economic unity is a
25
prelude to military and political reunion of the CIS.
Although
the specific forms of this reunion are to be decided, Russian
leaders use economic factors at their disposal to shape their
desired political ends. But at the same time they resent any
26
other state's attempt to play this same game.
Vice Premier Sergei Shakhray asserted that Russia bears
international legal responsibility for the Russians in the new
states. Until their legal status is fixed, "We will be at the
stage of a transitional period, and the methods and forms of
Russian guardianship of compatriots will largely correspond to
27
the quality of this transience."
Here again Russia is trying to
diminish CIS members' sovereignty and make up unilateral legal
pretexts for expansive political ends. The notion that Russia,
or other states, have a unique international legal responsibility
for their citizens abroad above that of the state where they
reside is another example of the imperialist doctrine of extraterritoriality (that citizens abroad are not subject to the host
country's laws but only to those of the country from which they
are claimed--in this case--to have come). Such reasoning and
political claims, in and of themselves, evince extremely
dangerous trends in Russian policies vis-a-vis all its CIS
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neighbors and the Baltic states which Foreign Minister Kozyrev
lists as the "near abroad." And the means to enforce such claims
is Russia's relative economic power vis-a-vis these states.
This power vis-a-vis Central Asia is therefore consciously
deployed to secure preferential treatment for Russia's state
interests and for ethnic Russians there. Ex-Vice Premier
Aleksandr' Shokhin stated in November 1993 that Russia would
deploy every instrument of economic policy to advance the causes
of reintegration and of the Russian diaspora. He stated that the
issue of Russian-speakers (not just Russians) abroad would appear
and be tied to all economic negotiations with Central Asia and
28
CIS members.
In December 1993, at the Ashgabat CIS summit, Russia tried
to push through a dual citizenship clause for Russians in the
"near abroad." Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev
publicly charged that this evoked the earlier Nazi policy towards
the Sudeten Germans in the 1930s, and it was shelved. But
Kyrgyzstan, whose economy is in tatters, agreed to it to stem the
outflow of skilled personnel. Turkmenistan then followed suit.
However, in early 1995, after a year of the kind of pressure on
Kazakhstan's economy described here, Kazakhstan acceded to a farreaching economic union pact with Russia and to a formula for
29
dual citizenship.
Russia not only wants to preserve Central Asia's dependence
upon its economy, it also seeks to codify a lasting privileged
position for Russians in Central Asia. Kozyrev stated that
Russia insisted on putting the Central Asian States into the CSCE
so that they could be arraigned there, for failing to protect the
30
civil rights of their Russian speaking minorities.
In July
1994, Yeltsin's commission for questions of citizenship, helped
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drafted guidelines for
Russian policy towards CIS states where Russians live. The draft
went into effect in August and strictly tied economic and
military cooperation with CIS states to observance of their
Russian communities' rights and interests. It called for talks
on establishing Russian language radio and TV service. Businesses
with Russian workers and public Russian communal organizations
should also receive Russian and local support. Additionally, a
share of Russian credits to CIS members should go to support
"Russian" factories, legalizing routine practice vis a-vis
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Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
31
territoriality.

This draft also represents extra-

Finally, more tangible oil interests are also at stake.
Lukoil's president, Vagit Alekperov, observed that if Russia did
not take such control over the Caspian shelf, it "risks losing
32
its positions on the Caspian Sea."
This bluntness about the
rivalry with Turkey is more credible than Russian or Turkish
33
claims of concern for the environment.
But Russia's policies must also be seen in their context of
domestic pressure to support the Russian diaspora, or the
imperatives of reform, or by both factors. For instance, ending
energy and other subsidies for wasteful consumers and inflation
trends involving the ruble are vital for Russia's own recovery.
Since Russia, as the largest player in the CIS, cannot conduct an
isolated economic policy, its major policies also have profound,
sometimes unforeseen impacts, upon Central Asian states which
also confront the contradiction between international
responsibilities to each other and the CIS as part of economic
interdependence and the imperative of domestic reform. All these
contradictions can become intense, even irreconcilable, a fact
34
Shafiqul Islam notes:
rarely appreciated here or abroad.
The R-5 agreement to create a new ruble zone and the
CIS accord to create a new economic union are two
concrete (and confused) responses to the conundrum that
the Central Asian and other non-Russian republics of
the former Soviet Union face: efforts to speed up the
cessation of the former economic dependence on Mother
Russia and the dismantling of the Union economy's
centrally planned economic interdependence greatly
compound the macroeconomic and
social costs of building a national economy where
economic interdependence is determined largely by
35
market forces. (Emphasis in original)
Similarly, objective economic conditions prevent Central
Asian states from operating armies for defense against very real
regional threats. Since they cannot provide for their own
36
security they need foreign help.
Naturally, he who pays calls
the tune. However Russia shows its concerns about Central Asian
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trends, it cannot remain oblivious to and aloof from them.
Russian soldiers are obviously one of many means of enforcing
hegemony.
Russian policies for gaining economic hegemony over Central
Asia evolved through several stages after the USSR collapsed. At
first subsidies to Central Asia for finished goods and energy
products continued. Russia also let republican central banks
issue ruble denominated credits so they could avoid economic
contraction that began when Russia's Gaidar Government freed
prices and launched economic reforms in 1992. This policy
greatly stimulated inflation at home and undermined Russia's own
economic interests. These subsidies cost an estimated 10-15
percent of Russia's GNP. Russia quickly decided to undo that
relationship and force Central Asia out of the ruble zone and
into a market-dominated system giving Russia substantial control
37
over their economies.
In 1992-93 Russia began issuing ultimata
that the republics accept the Central Bank of Russia's monetary
authority or stop issuing rubles as their domestic currency.
That policy triggered a series of moves that ultimately broke
down the ruble zone and led Central Asian states except
Tadzhikistan to create independent currencies. Though these
policies might seem to be a declaration of Central Asian
independence, they only altered the form of dependence on
38
Moscow.
Indeed they triggered Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz charges
that Russia exported its inflation to them, reneged on debts for
39
goods obtained from them, and held their oil pipelines hostage.
Russia decided that the old economic relationship greatly
obstructed reform and its interests. Moscow also concluded that
Russia could not house an expected flood of Russian emigres from
Central Asia. In addition, Russia became convinced that Central
Asia, if it became truly independent, would inevitably revert to
a hostile power, probably radical fundamentalist Iran or some
version of Pan-Turkism. A fourth, and possibly decisive
consideration was that the government was under fierce attack for
not protecting the Russian diaspora. Thus to maintain ethnic
Russians' leading role in Central Asia's economy, prevent Islamic
or Turkish revolution from spreading, and redress inflationary
balances in the economy, a new policy and strategy whose
objective was reintegration and strategic denial of these areas
40
to neighboring states has emerged.
Accordingly, Russian policy
in Central Asia has aimed to minimize and exclude any Turkish,
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Western, and Iranian foreign investment or political presence in
the region. The 1993 security and military doctrines explicitly
41
state this objective.
Russian experts and leaders asserted that foreign aid alone
cannot overcome Central Asia's profound crises. They postulated
that on its own the area will stagnate and become a major threat
42
to Russia. The sole alternative then becomes reintegration.
Russia vigorously followed up this assessment by direct economic
pressure on weak states like Kyrgyzstan to grant Russians dual
citizenship and to hold Kazakhstan's oil pipeline projects
43
"hostage."
For a long time to come, Russia can use its superior
economic leverage to export its inflation by manipulating ruble
balances and the supply of various vital petrochemical products.
Such policies allow it to preserve a role in Central Asia as
colonizer vis-a-vis the colonized. And as long as their oil
economies remain undeveloped, the Central Asian republics will
continue to be "quasi-autonomous appendages" of the Russian
44
economy.
Russia also apparently intends for the West to
continue to see the area through Russian eyes and accept this
45
situation.
Foreign energy and other investment to foster Central Asia's
economic independence from any one dominant economy or polity is
therefore essential to counter Russian imperial drives, though
Moscow views that as a fundamental threat to its interests. The
campaign against Azerbaidzhan's contract with the British-led
consortium showed that. Thus, Moscow will make major efforts to
use its control over Central Asia and fear of Central Asia's
self-assertion as a way of winning friends in Asia. In other
words, Moscow will invoke the specter of Islamic fundamentalism
at every opportunity, even if it is irrelevant to actual regional
conditions, in order to persuade other states that its hegemony
there is legitimate.
For example, well aware of Chinese concerns about rising
Islamic or Turkic solidarity in neighboring Xinjiang, Russia
partly bases its entente with China on a common interest in
46
quieting the area.
Moscow similarly deals with India as the
most recent communique of Premier Narishima Rao and President
47
Yeltsin attacking sectarian nationalism indicates.
Likewise,
Turkey's initial efforts to invest in Central Asia, control the
pipelines, and bypass Russia in that domain triggered an intense
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military and political antagonism toward Turkey. Russia's
successful resistance to Turkey in Central Asia and Transcaucasia
48
was the result.
Finally, Moscow has also moved to keep Iran out
by controlling foreign trade and energy routes, by making Iran
depend on Russian arms sales, and by suppressing Baku's interest
in reuniting with Iran's Azeri population in return for a non49
aggressive policy in Central Asia.
The Current Situation.
Lately, emphasis has shifted to the struggle over energy
pipelines and explorations. That shift reflects developments in
Transcaucasia and the expectation of Western exploration and
massive investment there and in Central Asia. Fear of Western
presence has intensified Russian pressure in Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan for oil privileges and for Russians' dual
citizenship. Kazakhstan grasps the meaning of Russian pressure
and openly proclaims its need for Western support against those
threats. Former Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev told NATO that
Kazakhstan must act in the real world without firm guarantees
that its security will not be at risk. Therefore it must
strengthen its own and regional security, gain economic
independence, and join the world economy. There is no option but
50
Ex-Prime
for it to join associations like NATO to that end.
Minister Sergei Tereshchenko was even more specific in talking
about Kazakhstan's foreign economic relations. He said that
Nazarbayev's personal participation in--and guarantee of--foreign
ventures and of Kazakhstan's stable foreign relations was a major
51
reason for foreign investment there.
These statements indicate
the stakes of energy independence for Kazakhstan and show how
much leverage Russia can employ to obstruct it.
Since Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan cannot refine and convert
their energy products into finished goods, they turned to Russia
to exchange oil for Central Asian cotton. But Russia learned
that Central Asians preferred selling cotton to foreign currency
buyers since Moscow was subsidizing their energy anyway. This
forced Russia to look abroad for cotton, reduce purchases from
Central Asia, and sell oil to Central Asia and others for foreign
52
currency.
Transition to the market and global integration led
to bilateral economic rivalry. Each side sought customers who
could pay for their goods and options to avoid spending scarce
foreign currency. That search added to Russia's motives to end
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energy subsidies and destroy the ruble union.
Russia then shifted tactics to "get them (i.e., the oil53
Exploiting
producing states-author) by their pipelines."
Central Asian dependence on Russian pipelines, Moscow
systematically coerced Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In November
1993, Gazprom, Russia's natural gas company, cut off Turkmen gas
54
exports to Europe, their main source of profits.
Gazprom also
made major demands on both states concerning oil exports. Seeing
oil debts as a way to foster integration, Russia promoted debt
for equity swaps where the equity was shares in state oil and gas
55
That proposal meant effective Russian takeover of these
firms.
companies.
Russia also pressured Kazakhstan for preference in granting
exploration licenses and for participation in the massive
56
Chevron-Tengiz project.
As in Azerbaidzhan, Russia then
demanded sizable percentages of Kazakhstan's oil and gas revenues
in return for use of its pipelines. Russia also reportedly
demanded a 20-40 percent interest in Kazakh fields under
57
Russia also insisted that the oil then be loaded
exploration.
onto Russian tankers for export. Otherwise, as it has done in
the past, Russia would continue to block plans to ship oil
58
produced in Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan. There are unconfirmed
reports that Russia won this concession. If so, it was also
helped by President Clinton's public support for the Russian
route, and staunch U.S. opposition to any pipelines traversing
59
Iran. U.S. opposition to Iran's presence in Central Asian
energy affairs removes effective alternatives to Russian control
of pipelines.
Moscow also blocked almost all Kazakhstan's oil exports from
May-August 1994. This deprived Kazakhstan of foreign energy
sales, hard currency, and of means for developing economic ties
with the West, and forced its refineries to stop production.
Kazakh energy officials believed that the pressure was connected
60
to Russian demands for a share in Kazakhstan's oil projects.
They duly hurried to commission construction of new pipelines and
61
kept searching for alternate pipelines.
Here Russia signalled
Kazakhstan and its potential Western partners that unless they
recognized Russia's interest, they would not market any oil.
Russian pressure also slowed the start of Chevron's Tengiz
project and raised its costs. That led Chevron to cut back its
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investment in May 1994. Since the project is a litmus test for
foreign ventures, cancellation would be a catastrophe for
62
Kazakhstan leaving it no option but Russia.
Russia's pressure worked. By August 1994, Kazakhstan was
allowed to send twice the previous amount of petroleum products
63
Kazakhstanmunaigaz, an
through Russian pipelines and waterways.
oil and gas producer, handed over its export transit volume of
one million tons of oil to Russia's oil company, Rosneft, for
64
reexport.
These actions had major economic and, ultimately,
political implications. Kazakhstan's oil producers, bereft of
currency income, had to assume high-interest bank loans. Industry
experts said Kazakhstan must export at least 250,000 tons of oil
to pay off the loans. Almaty counts on Moscow's consent to ship
about 125,000 tons of oil through Russia in August and September
1994. Kazakhstan would receive about $20 million (about $160/ton65
a ridiculously low price-author) from these exports.
In Turkmenistan, Russia cut off Turkmen gas exports to
Europe and tried to cut itself in on any future pipeline
construction. Russia also apparently bought Turkmenistan's gas
supply at low prices and resold it to Turkey at a 300 percent
markup. In early 1994, Russia also negotiated with Turkmenistan,
Iran, and Turkey to construct a pipeline to ship oil and gas from
Turkmenistan to Europe and to build oil and gas complexes. But
in June, Turkish papers wrote that Russian obstruction had held
up work on the pipeline and no concrete project has been drawn up
yet. Consequently the $5 billion needed to lay the pipeline have
66
not been acquired.
For Ankara, shipping this oil and gas
through Turkey by 1996 is essential, so delay hits its vital
67
interests.
At the same time, Russia pressured Turkmenistan to grant the
Russians there dual citizenship. Its pressure on Turkmenistan's
energy programs was leverage to obtain this outcome. In
Ashagabat, Turkmenistan reversed course and joined the CIS so
Russia signed an accord with the Turkmen government granting
Russians parity rights and pledging joint regulation of migration
flows. Even so, Russian media attacked Yeltsin for selling out
and not getting an ironclad agreement. The Russian media ignored
the insult implicit in dual citizenship. But Turkmenistan hopes
to gain from having Russian troops defend it against military
threats or pressure on existing energy programs as it seeks
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pipelines with its neighbor, Iran. In President Sapurmurad
Niyazov's words, "We have gained something by joining the CIS.
We understand that. The only thing we don't want is to have the
68
Such frank
decisions that it adopts be binding on our country."
cynicism is refreshing, and shows Turkmenistan's confidence that
it can escape dependence on Russia and still prosper.
For now authoritarian Turkmenistan appears relatively
69
stable. If it can resist pressure to alter its economic and
domestic policies to Moscow's taste, it will prove Roland
Dannreuther's assertion that Central Asia's current dependence on
Russia is ending since Russia is retreating from Central Asia and
70
the Muslim world and its leverage is diminishing accordingly.
Despite Russian pressure, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still have,
and are exercising the option to find, other routes for their oil
71
Should other takers appear, they will move toward them
and gas.
to gain freedom vis-a-vis Russia. Washington's earlier
preference for a Russian route certainly does not bind them. For
instance, in January 1995, the Clinton administration reversed
course and supported a pipeline from Azerbaidzhan (and by
implication Central Asia) through the Caspian Sea, directly to
72
This decision certainly offers Central Asian states
Turkey.
more leeway in approaching pipeline issues.
But in military affairs Central Asia's dependence on Russia
is unavoidable and facilitates Russia's enduring belief that its
real border is that of Central Asia with China, Iran, and
Afghanistan. However, Russian military assistance also means
that Russia must spend scarce money to protect Central Asia.
Russian costs in Tadzhikistan are high and growing, but no
solution to that war is at hand. Russia, arguably, has
guaranteed authoritarianism in Tashkent by sending troops to
Tadzhikistan. But it cannot, in the end, break Central Asian
73
progress and foreign economic integration.
Too harsh a policy, by costing too much, could rebound upon
a Russia that cannot afford an empire. Then Russia's allies' and
clients' interests, not Russian ones, would dictate policy. That
could be the real future of Russian relations with Central Asia.
Strategic denial of Central Asia to foreign states in an era of a
global economy is prohibitively costly, if not infeasible.
Central Asia can relate to foreign states whose regional
interests are incompatible with a new Russian empire, e.g. China,
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Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran.
Too strong a Russian pressure could lead Central Asian
states to resist Moscow or to collaborate with Moscow's rivals
with possible Western and Japanese support in the background.
Since Moscow cannot monopolize the region, and Russian
populations are leaving Central Asia (emigration being about one
million a year for the last 5 years), its current economic
pressure on the region, though dangerous, may yet prove to be
unsustainable.
The most recent developments in Azerbaidzhan suggest that
Russia is encountering precisely these difficulties. Despite
Russian pressure, Baku signed a contract with a consortium led by
British Petroleum, SOCAR, including Lukoil, on September 20,
1994. Though Lukoil's presence at the signing signified its
hopes for sizable revenues from the projects, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs publicly and strongly rejected Azerbaidzhan's
right to make this contract. Thus internal policy divisions
about Azerbaidzhan are roiling the Russian government. These
factions may yet reunite over the pipeline issue, since a purely
Transcaucasian pipeline would freeze Russia out of the
Transcaucasus and Central Asia while uniting those two regions.
Accordingly, in the future, pipeline routes are the real
question. Although Russia's factional divisions could possibly
be exploited and demonstrate the continuing incoherence of
Russian policymaking, viewed in the context of the drive for
reintegration and control over oil by controlling pipelines, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will likely reunite with the Ministry
of Fuel and Energy and Lukoil to secure their interests at the
74
next stage.
But in any case, Russia will not soon cease trying
to subject Transcaucasia and Central Asia to its interests and
compel reunion. To determine if Russia can overcome potential or
real rivals in Central Asia we must look at Russia's challengers
there.
Russia's Rivals in Central Asia.
Even if Central Asian states are helpless "appendages" of
Russian policy that depend on its economy and army, other states
seek a long-term foothold precisely in those sectors where Russia
aims to dominate: energy, transportation, and trade. Just like
Russia, some rivals evince a great fear of Islamic assertiveness.
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Iran, however seeks to exploit and facilitate this force. Other
states' involvement is growing and revolves around strategic
goals similar to those animating Russian policy. The themes that
drive Turkey's, Iran's, Pakistan's, China's, India's, and U.S.
policies (as well as those of Israel, Japan, and Saudi Arabia) in
Central Asia are energy, Islamism or Turkic solidarity, and a
broader relationship with Russia. Often, though not always,
these themes have a negative aspect. Russia's rivals are
motivated not only by economic opportunity but by a desire to
deny either Islam, or Russia--or both--from dominating the
region. Japan, for example, aims to check Russia in Asia due to
75
the frosty Russo-Japanese relations.
Therefore, Tokyo is
displaying a rising interest in Central Asian economic growth.
Japan sponsored Central Asian states' membership in the Asian
Development Bank and explores bilateral oil and pipeline deals
76
and economic assistance programs there.

Turkey. Turkey's approach to Central Asia has invoked
Islamic and Turkic solidarity and Realpolitik to restrain Russian
influence. At its grandest, Turkish policy, outlined by the late
Premier and President Turgut Ozal, sought to enhance Turkey's
international presence from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of
China, wherever Turkic peoples were involved. Though attacked as
neo-Ottomanism or reborn Pan-Turkism, it was more a policy of
economic penetration, especially in the Black Sea and Central
Asia, and of cultural diffusion, a kind of civilizing mission to
show the superiority of Turkey's brand of a secular, modernizing,
Islamic state to younger brothers. Ozal's thinking and policy
reflected Europe's ambivalence about including Turkey in the West
and the exuberance following the Gulf War and fall of Soviet
power. Backed by the Bush administration, Ankara pursued a
greater economic presence around its borders to stabilize those
areas, generate a new rationale for Turkey's inclusion in the
West--its "civilizing mission" to Central Asia and Transcaucasia-and present a counter-model of a secular, democratic,
Westernizing Muslim state that would check Iran ideologically and
77
Iran and Russia politically.
Turkey has invested several billion dollars in Central Asia,
mainly in culture, education, telecommunications, and
transportation to draw Central Asia closer to it and to the West.
However, in 1994 Turkey has little to show for the policy. Today
Turkey is in headlong retreat from Ozal's grandiose vistas. Its
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inability to help Azerbaidzhan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and
refusal to confront Russia there allowed Russia to deny
Transcaucasia and Central Asia to Turkish military influence.
Unable to project military power, Turkey has lost ground. Its
Central Asian trade, despite its investments, is still small, and
cultural tensions inherent in posing as Central Asia's big
brother have arisen. For Central Asia today, the West is the
78
West, not Turkey.
At home Turkey suffers from massive inflation and a
persistent Kurdish insurgency. This insurgency apparently has
caused half the annual inflation rate of 70 percent. Turkey's
military talked of martial law, or of intervening in Azerbaidzhan
but could do neither. Meanwhile Islamic parties have made major
79
gains in Turkish politics.
Ankara's post-Cold War security
policy exceeded its means. As the threat of imminent
politicized Islam in Central Asia receded, the United States lost
interest in Turkey as a model, though it occasionally invokes
80
that line.
More importantly, U.S. aid to Turkey is now tied to
a concessionary human rights policy toward the Kurds.
Increasingly Turkey feels isolated and neglected by allies who,
it believes, cannot fully grasp the nature of the looming Russian
81
or other threats facing Turkey.
These domestic and foreign
policy setbacks have hobbled Turkey's drive to become a great
Central Asian factor.
Finally the centerpiece of Turkey's grand design to become
the Rotterdam of the Middle East is endangered because Russia
fights Turkey's pipeline policies. As part of a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh war involving territorial exchanges, Turkey
aimed to create a pipeline from Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan
82
through purely Muslim territories that bypassed Russia and Iran.
It is unlikely that this can be achieved. Russian pressure on
the producers, and negotiations with Greece to reroute Greece's
pipeline to Russia from the Black Sea through Bulgaria's coast to
Thessaloniki, aim to outflank Turkey and its policies of closing
83
the Bosporous to tankers, allegedly on ecological grounds.
In
any case, the Kurdish insurgency makes Turkey's oil policy moot
since it takes place where the pipelines are intended to go and
84
the Kurds have repeatedly targeted these pipelines. There is
also a growing likelihood that Russia will support the Kurds
against Turkey and further deflect Ankara from a vigorous
85
international policy.
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All these developments exposed the shaky foundations upon
which Ozal's vision rested. Clearly, only with vigorous and
consistent U.S. support can Turkey counter Russian policies.
Unless that support is forthcoming, constant and tangible, and
there is no real reason to expect it as President Clinton's
preferred pipeline policy shows, Turkey will either have to make
a deal on Russia's terms or join a broader anti-Russian coalition
on its allies' terms. When we also assess Turkey's meager
cultural and historic connection with Central Asia, it becomes
clear that the joint U.S.-Turkish initiative in 1991-92 deeply
misread Turkey's true possibilities. Turkish success now depends
upon resolving its domestic problems and upon lasting, vigorous,
Western backing. Otherwise, in Central Asia Turkey will be
marginalized and distracted by unsolved domestic problems.
More recently Kurdish, domestic, economic, and Iraqi issues
led Ankara to mend relations with Iran and Iraq. As resistance to
America and disillusionment with the West grows, that move is
eminently sensible if Turkey seeks an enhanced position in the
CIS and more flexibility to resolve the Kurdish problem's foreign
dimensions. President Suleiman Demirel's trip to Tehran in July
1994 was very successful. The communique and post-summit reports
stated that both states discussed cooperation on shipping Central
Asian energy through Iranian and Turkish pipeline routes that
86
would bypass Russia.
While this is far from an alliance, and
motives for cooperation transcend Russian policy, both states'
desire to increase their leverage in the CIS is only possible by
joint action.

Iran. Washington also misread Iran's policies and prospects
in Central Asia in 1991-92. Top policymakers believed that since
the new states were Muslim ones, all Muslims were alike and
inherently predisposed to Khomeinism-the root of all evil. They
thus injected much nonsense into the public debate, e.g.
asserting that the differences between Sunni and Shiite Muslims
that are a major obstacle to Iranian domination were meaningless
87
and that all Muslims were "pretty much the same."
Therefore
they were naturally vulnerable to Iranian-type rule. This
misguided viewpoint perpetuated the stereotype that the Central
88
Asian states were helpless objects of others' designs.
In fact Iran's Central Asian policy has been quite cautious.
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In Transcaucasia, Tehran has supported Christian Armenia against
Azerbaidzhan through 1994, fearing irredentism among its own
large Azeri population. If Iran has conducted terrorism and
subversion in Central Asia, it is well hidden. There is also no
concrete evidence that Iranian versions of Islam have displaced
indigenous Islam. Though Iran's relationship with Russia is
traditionally wary and edgy, its discords with Moscow are
89
confined to media polemics, not open rivalry.
This is not to say Iran has been quiescent or passive.
Rather it seeks to enhance its ties in Central Asia through
bilateral accords on pipelines and the construction of
transportation routes, railways, air travel, roads to ports like
Bandar Abbas, and so forth. Iran also promotes multilateral fora
like the Muslim Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Earlier
it challenged Turkey's Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and
pipeline aims by creating a Caspian Sea organization. Iran also
particularly cultivates Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on pipelines
90
and transport networks.
Iran's relationship with Moscow is complex. Iran needs
Russia to gain entry into Transcaucasia, reassure its neighbors
in the Gulf, and depends upon Russia as a major arms supplier
when few will sell it arms. It also is allegedly susceptible to
Russian appeals to keep Westerners out of the Caspian Sea. But
it also suspects Russian aims in Tadzhikistan's civil war where
Russian troops are keeping a Soviet-type regime in power,
91
ostensibly against Iranian-type fundamentalists.
While Iran's
connection to the Tajik rebels is unclear, Tehran is not eager
for Russian troops to dominate Tadzhikistan. Therefore, it
offered Iranian forces as peacekeepers to help settle the war,
92
something Russia staunchly rejects.
Internally Iran also confronts a severe economic and
political crisis. Rioting at home is spreading as regions demand
more autonomy from Tehran. Economic distress is real and
93
pervasive, and Iran remains isolated from the West. These
factors threaten Iran's stability and underscore the fact that
Iranian Islam might be a weapon of terror abroad, but has no
answer to the Muslim world's problems and is subject to the same
disenchantment and disillusion that incites other fundamentalist
uprisings. While Iran regards Russia as part of "the West," it
focuses its anger and disappointment on Washington, whom it

19

accuses of blocking pipeline deals with Kazakhstan and
94
Turkmenistan.
While there are signs of rapprochement with Turkey on
Kurdish, Transcaucasian, pipeline, and religious issues, both
states' volatile internal situations preclude easy formation of a
successful united front against Russia in Central Asia. Too many
domestic constituencies in both states will oppose a deal unless
both governments gain considerable backing abroad and overcome
95
their internal economic problems.
That is the precondition for
Iran and Turkey to achieve their individual and joint (but
differently conceived) minimum goal of Central Asia's economic
freedom from Russia. Thus Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati recently stressed that peace in Tadzhikistan is tied to
all Central Asia's independence (i.e. if Russian troops leave or
are balanced, these states gain more freedom to draw closer to
Iran). Local economic growth could then preserve and consolidate
96
that independence.
In the context of Iran's internal crisis, Iran alone
neither can, nor will, directly challenge Russia in Central Asia.
Nor will it align with Western policy as did Turkey. Since
repeated hints of a desire to approach the United States went for
nought, Iran ultimately risks strategic isolation from the big
97
powers.
Rapprochement with Turkey is helpful but goes only so
far, as does an approach to Pakistan or India. India and China
firmly oppose any "Islamic policy" in Central Asia and will not
contest Russia on those grounds. Instead, they will support
Russian efforts against national or religious outbreaks in
98
If Central
Central Asia to defend their own domestic stability.
Asia is important to Iran, the demand for influence there will
add to pressure for radical internal transformation to enhance
Iran's capabilities. By all accounts that is currently almost
99
impossible to achieve due to Iran's political gridlock.
Iran's options are limited to economic penetration and
support or to attempts to expand its cultural-ideological
influence. Economic weakness holds it back from a major role in
Central Asia. Although Iran sponsors the Central Asian states in
the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and has the major
goal of reestablishing the medieval silk road from the Middle
East to China, it cannot offer the tangible support these states
need. Furthermore, its price for doing so is regarded with
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suspicion. Nor have Iran's cultural and ideological aspirations
fared well. The Sunni/Shiite religious cleavage and the TurcoIranian cultural/ethnic divide in Central Asia hinder Iranian
influence despite Iranian and pro-Iranian claims that local
101
culture basically derives from Persian culture.
Central Asian
elites also view Khomeinism negatively, being educated in a more
technocratic Soviet style. Across Central Asia Islamic parties
are the opposition, and the regimes in power, particularly
Uzbekistan's, suppress them ruthlessly. While in time this
resistance to any reform may bring a politicized Islamic party to
power, the very nationalism that animated Iran since 1979 will
help block Iranian expansion.
Lastly, all the CIS' Muslim rulers know that Iran supported
Armenia in its war with Azerbaidzhan lest Azeri nationalism stir
up Azeris in Iran who feel oppressed by Tehran. This has not
helped Iran abroad, especially in Baku. Reportedly during
Aliyev's 1994 visit to Tehran, Iran's leaders sought his support
for their efforts against the Arab-Israeli peace process in the
name of Islamic solidarity. That gambit led him to chastise
102
More
Tehran's double standard of support for Armenia.
recently, Uzbek President Islam Karimov again charged Iran with
supporting fundamentalists who want to subvert his government and
103
provoked Iran's expected counterblast.
Consequently Iran alone cannot threaten Russia's regional
interests despite mounting Russian hysteria over fundamentalist
Islam. That hysteria owes more to atavistic Russian politicalcultural traditions and to the need to justify Russia's new
nationalism and neo-imperialism at home than it does to reality.
Indeed, Iran competes with Pakistan, as with Turkey, for
influence over Central Asian energy and economies. The rivalry
with Pakistan, like the resulting cooperation with India, is
recognized abroad. Iran's foreign relations, therefore, hardly
104
manifest a purely Islamic policy.
Like Turkey, Iran will remain
a player, but it cannot unilaterally and fundamentally assist
Central Asia or meaningfully shake the emerging status quo. If
it expands its rapprochement with Ankara, Iran could conceivably
block Russian ambitions and be a force upon which Central Asian
states might rely. But first both states must radically change
their policies, an unlikely prospect.

Pakistan, India, and Central Asia.
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Upon becoming

independent, Central Asian states also found themselves involved
in Pakistan's security agenda. Pakistan's interest in Central
Asia sharply increased after the USSR collapsed (since it
perceived a new strategic opportunity there). But Pakistan's
policies inevitably led India to show more interest in the
region, too. Central Asia in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry is more
than a sideshow. It is potentially Pakistan's or India's
strategic rear and, as such, merits both states' cultivation and
close attention.
Pakistani perceptions and policies reflect the melange of
Islamic, geopolitical, and economic interests cited above.
Stresses on transportation linkages, at home to unite its
disparate provinces, and abroad to integrate first Afghanistan
and now Central Asia, are central and longstanding pillars of
105
Pakistan's strategy.
Once Central Asia became free and
Moscow's influence in Afghanistan died, unexpected strategic
vistas opened up to Pakistan's policymakers. They saw their
opportunity in a context that tied together Islamism,
geopolitical and strategic rivalry with India, and economic
opportunity through trade and transport.
Apparently, all factions in Pakistani politics agree on
the importance of the Central Asian opportunity presented to
Islamabad. But they disagree on whether to emphasize Islamic
unity against India, the creation of an economic hinterland and
vast market for Pakistani goods and services to join Central Asia
and Pakistan through major land and air transportation routes, or
106
Pakistan's
Central Asia as a strategic rear against India.
military is preoccupied with attaining such a rear against any
future Indian war. Pakistan would then allegedly have access to
military supplies that the superior Indian navy and air force
107
could not interdict.
This projected Central Asia includes
Afghanistan and Xinjiang, China's Western province, with a large
Muslim population of Kazakhs and Kyrygz. The economic objective
in this analysis is an integrated bloc from these areas, with a
108
Pakistani transport hub, especially its roads and ports.
Pakistan attempted all three objectives: strategicpolitical, economic, and religious-ideological. It quickly
recognized the new states and sponsored Pakistani Airlines (PIA)
linkages to the area and schemes of transport projects and oil
pipelines through Afghanistan into Pakistan and its ports.
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Political support, economic integration, and Muslim solidarity,
it was believed, would pave the way for the broader strategic
109
unity envisioned in the strategy.
However, this strategic vision becomes unrealizable
because it is beyond Pakistan's capabilities. Nor does it square
with Central Asian interests. These governments cannot form an
Islamic league and benefit too much from trade with India just to
gratuitously enter the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Second, Pakistan
cannot become a regional economic powerhouse. It lacks both the
resources and direct overland routes to Central Asia. To gain
that direct access it must link up with Xinjiang or Afghanistan.
Both options are currently out of the question. China strongly
opposes any "Islamic" policy and pursues a policy to integrate
Xinjiang's economy with its own and Central Asia's economies to
110
For the same
make the latter states more dependent upon China.
reasons it strongly opposes Pakistan's sponsoring of Muslim
111
separatist movements in India and an independent Kashmir.
Afghanistan's continuing civil war also precludes major
investment there to build a trade route. No major foreign
investment will be forthcoming while fighting continues.
Furthermore, Central Asian states told Pakistan that they regard
any Pakistani sponsorship of fundamentalist Afghan parties a
112
hostile and inflammatory act.
Even in 1991, they warned
Pakistan that such policies would provoke the Tajiks there, lead
to a breakup of Tajikistan, generate violence, massive refugee
113
flows, and trigger an unacceptable possible domino effect.
This warning mandates Pakistani caution in Central Asia.
Finally, Pakistan's Islamic offensive in Kashmir, support
for Indian secessionists, and interest in Central Asia registered
in New Delhi as parts of an anti-Indian Islamic policy. India
reacted quickly to expand trade and economic ties with Central
Asia and cooperate with Iran and Russia against Pakistan's
influence. The recent Yeltsin-Rao declaration showed their joint
opposition to any efforts to incite inter-ethnic or interreligious discords and to destabilize states, governments, and
114
borders.
That joint policy dates from 1992. India's
ambassador to Russia then commented that "Close to our borders
lies an important area of Asia, in which peace and stability are
in our common interests. Remembering this, we would like to
115
build up our joint efforts in this direction."
Subsequently,
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experts from both states viewed Central Asia as veering away from
Turkish influence and expressed joint concern about a long-term
period of unrest and instability that fundamentalists will try to
116
Accordingly, India supports Iran's efforts to build a
exploit.
117
railway to Turkmenistan to divert trade from Pakistan.
And in
state visits Central Asian and Indian leaders openly express
118
their antipathy to fundamentalist politics.
Therefore Pakistan, like Russia's other Muslim rivals,
cannot hope, on its own, to be a regional guarantor or hegemon.
Any effort to do so will disrupt overall regional power balances,
greatly increase instability, shatter its alliance with China,
and highlight Pakistan's inability to conduct a grand strategy
and policy. Pakistan can only achieve meaningful success in
Central Asia if it moderates its aims and collaborates with other
rivals of Russian policy, e.g. Iran and Turkey.
Clearly Russia's Islamic rivals in Central Asia cannot
supplant Russia unless they collaborate together. Even then it
is doubtful that they have the necessary economic and ideological
requirements to overcome Russian influence in Central Asia.
Neither the fundamentalists nor prophets of Pan-Turkism or PanIslamism can compete with Russia or China, and the West, led by
119
the United States.

China. China is Russia's likeliest and strongest future
competitor in Central Asia. This is not by default. China, as
Russian and Western observers understand, has many important
advantages in the contest. A recent Russian analysis concludes:
China, moving gradually toward a leading position in
the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet era, has
similar geographical advantages (of bordering directly
on the area--author). It has far fewer limitations than
its Middle Eastern rivals. A regulated economy, which
is more compatible with the economies of the Central
Asian republics, a secular state, and available
financial means are also on the plus side. China offers
the Central Asian states the use of its territory to
gain direct access to the Pacific and on to the Far
120
East and Southeast Asia.
Analysts are fully aware of China's growing wealth, power,
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and reach across Asia. China is, in many ways, stronger than
Russia. Furthermore, Russia now needs Chinese help to enter East
121
and Southeast Asia.
More importantly, China has a mature,
well-conceived strategic concept that addresses its interests and
goals in Central Asia. Not surprisingly, its concept also
connects the questions of trade routes, transportation networks,
Islam, and energy.
For now, China's objectives are to preclude rising Islamic
or nationalist agitation among its Muslim peoples (Kazakhs,
Kyrgyz, Uighur)in Xinjiang and its Western provinces bordering
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
China has good reasons to fear
Islamic unrest. In 1990, the widening division between the coast
and the periphery in economics and the devolution of powers to
regional governments led Western Xinjiang, on Central Asia's
border, to became a center of uprisings, undoubtedly inspired by
the centrifugal tendencies already visible across the Soviet
border. China had to send 200,000 troops there. That revolt
culminated an apparent series of constantly spreading annual
uprisings since 1980 that have not yet ceased. China has not
crushed Xinjiang's underground, and anti-Chinese feeling is
pervasive due to Chinese immigration, economic differentials
122
among the population, and the Chinese political domination.
Given the oil deposits, the nearby location of the Lop Nor
nuclear center, and the looming succession struggle in Beijing,
this unrest and the threat it spawns had to be curbed.
China believes it can temper, if not minimize, the potential
for such Pan-Islamic or nationalist agitation by an economic
policy that more closely integrates Xinjiang and Central Asia
with the Chinese economy. This policy objective is achievable
only if China can establish intimate trading ties in Central
Asia, support existing governments and their relationship with
Russia, and greatly upgrade Xinjiang's economic development and
integration with its Eastern and coastal provinces. The intended
goal is to reestablish and expand the old silk road into a modern
trade route integrating Central Asia, Western China, the
interior, and Coastal China into one network. Developing
Xinjiang's enormous Tarym Basin energy deposits is essential to
this end because China has now become a net energy importer.
Since China's energy consumption and demand are expected to
grow sharply, stability in Xinjiang and Central Asia is vital for
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China's continued economic growth and modernization.
Otherwise, China's ability to sustain its political posture and
economic growth will come into question. Equally importantly,
unless China faces the problems confronting Beijing in its Muslim
provinces: a devolution of power to the regions and economic
124
imbalances among them, ethnic unrest will increase.
Projects
to link Turkmen and Kazakh energy deposits to pipelines running
125
through China rather than Russia are being encouraged.
Strong ties with Russia and support for its Central Asian
policies are steps toward that goal. Strong trade relations and
development of Xinjiang's economy and oil deposits are other
steps. Those policies also support China's larger international
economic strategy of gaining more energy and growing presence in
126
Asia's international economies.
Therefore, China prominently celebrates every advance in oil
production from 11 million tons from local fields in 1993 to the
127
Integrating Central Asia's large
scheduled 17 million in 1995.
energy deposits with China's would reduce pressure on the Tarym
Basin, stimulate regional and political integration of Central
Asia and Xinjiang with China's coastal provinces and Beijing, and
128
ease ethnic tensions.
Vice Premier and Politburo Member Zou
Jiahua, on an inspection tour to Xinjiang, tied all this
together, noting that higher production, particularly in energy,
was significant "in promoting the sustained growth of China's oil
and gas production; as well as in stimulating Xinjiang's economic
development, consolidating the frontier, and enhancing unity
129
among nationalities in the region."
China's strategic profile in Xinjiang is also intimately
tied to the larger problems of China's role in Asian security and
its intense search for hegemonic positions in the offshore oil
deposits located in the South China Sea. As a Japanese analysis
observes, China's success is bound up with ability to build
130
infrastructure and transportation capabilities.
Second,
China's role as a factor of Asian stability is bound up with its
ability to produce enough oil and gas and stabilize its economy.
Therefore policies to meet rising demand for energy are directly
linked to Xinjiang's stability and growth. Failure here means
that China must move more into its offshore areas and further
buildup its already growing navy which has heightened security
131
anxieties across Asia.
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Central Asia's rising importance for domestic stability,
economic growth, self-sufficiency, and Asian policy has a flip
side. Any serious outbreak of instability in Xinjiang or Central
Asia strikes at vital Chinese interests and demonstrates a
vulnerability that China must suppress or coopt. Since China and
Russia are both vulnerable to Islamic based threats, their
collaboration in Central Asia should be expected for some time to
come. This common threat perception of assertive Islamic or
nationalistic forces is part of the larger basic harmony in views
and strategic interests that has led to Sino-Russian entente in
132
Asia. China clearly benefits greatly from this relationship.
These considerations also explain China's coolness towards
Turkey, which Beijing has long suspected of harboring Pan-Turkic
133
For a while China encouraged Iran
designs on Chinese Muslims.
and Russia against Turkey's efforts which it regarded as support
for pan-Turkism. But that support also implies that China will
134
not support any Iranian adventures in Central Asia.
Similarly,
China strongly opposed Kashmir separatism, even if it weakens
135
India, for fear of Islam.
But despite China's present cooperation with Russia in
Central Asia, China is likely to emerge over time as the great
counterbalance of the Central Asian states to exclusive
dependence upon Russia. The reasons for this are China's weight,
growth, the urgency of its interests, ability to influence
events, and determination to play a role in the area. As China's
and Asia's need for energy grows, China's need to stabilize
Central Asia and prevent disruptions in energy and trade will
grow. Ultimately this will lead Beijing to invest more political
as well as economic resources and to expand its influence there.
These factors are already visible in the growth of trade with
China and the Central Asian states' search for alternative
pipelines to Russia. Since both South Korea and Japan are also
interested in investing in pipelines through Central Asia and
China, so, too, will their leverage in Central Asia grow.
Ultimately this trend can only diminish Russian influence,
especially if Russia cannot mimic China's rapid economic growth.
China is altogether a more substantial partner than any
other potential Russian rival. And Chinese interests are
incompatible with reformers and religious fundamentalists in
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power. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it will be necessary to
play off Moscow against Beijing to avert excessive dependence on
either one. Although both Russia and China must find positions
in Central Asia's economy, Russia's attraction is based on
existing infrastructure and past ties, and will likely siphon
resources out of the area without materially helping to develop
it. China's attraction is based on a self-sustaining dynamism
that sees it to its advantage to develop Central Asia and truly
integrate it into China's economic orbit. Though China and
Russia are now allies, a long-term distancing and even mutual
rivalry in Central Asia is likely, and more probable since only
China has the local means and ability, and perhaps the will to
challenge Russian regional interests. Certainly China sees
itself as only now beginning to play its rightful role in world
affairs due to its wealth, power, and status. That feeling can
only grow as those attributes increase and they could easily lead
to a clash of vital interests in Central Asia.

The United States. Central Asian trends do not directly
affect vital U.S. interests, yet both the Clinton and Bush
administrations have expressed interest in Central Asia's
democratization, development of market economies,
denuclearization, and in discouraging fundamentalism. A
governing principle of U.S. policy has been its determination, as
part of the broader policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran,
to obstruct Central Asia's rapprochement with Iran. In practice,
the main line is, as Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
stated, "focusing on those areas of the globe where success in
one country or region will have an influence on surrounding
136
areas." This means that support for Central Asian reform
focuses mainly on Russia in the belief that if reform succeeds
there it will likely succeed among Russia's neighbors. This
point appears as well in President Clinton's 1994 national
137
security statement.
However, real Russian reform should renounce neo-imperialist
programs that coercively diminishes CIS members' sovereignty.
Unfortunately, the opposite is happening. This does not
necessarily mean that reform in Russia has failed. Rather,
reform is not what foreign supporters claim it to be, i.e., a
138
model for Central Asia or a basis for an end to empire.
Indeed, it is reformers who tried to force Central Asia into a
Russian bloc. When we cast foreign states as models for third
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parties, those models: Turkey, and certainly Russia, take their
role too seriously. Since Russian policy in Central Asia
evidently tends towards neo-colonialism, any "strategic alliance
with Russian reform" means in practice accepting Russia's neocolonial relationship to Central Asia. This relationship cannot
sustain true market reforms or promote democracy in either
region.
U.S. calls for democratization, open doors for U.S.
investment, and support for Russia as a model and leader embrace
a contradictory logic since support for Russia means excluding
foreign investment and hindering democracy which cannot flourish
in conditions of neo-colonialism and Central Asia's blasted
ecologies and economies. Today, Russian pressure on Kazakhstan
may lead Chevron to reconsider its investment in the Tengiz oil
139
fields that is a litmus test for other Western investment.
We
cannot reconcile demands for an open door and democratic market,
while supporting renewed Russian hegemonic aspirations.
Conclusions.
Central Asian states, on their own have, made initiatives
140
for more unity and not submission to Moscow or anyone else.
The
United States should encourage these joint efforts as well as
multilateral Western projects to meet regional economic and
ecological needs. Inclusion in a Russian bloc inhibits Central
Asia from real integration with the global economy at a time when
it is not standing still but seeking that integration.
This analysis strongly suggests that Russia is overplaying
its hand in Central Asia. Russia can obstruct the Kazakh and
Turkmen economies through its energy policies. But it then risks
inflaming all of Central Asia's desperate economic-ecological
situations and civil strife, such as presently exists in
Tadzhikistan. By forcing these states into a subservient
backwardness, Russia promotes conditions that virtually guarantee
continuing conflicts. Nor can Russia afford to reconstruct
Central Asia's economies to prevent future crises. A policy that
therefore ignores the region and focuses on Moscow abets its
current but misguided policies.
When viewed strategically, Central Asia, because it is
marginal to the West and important to the states discussed here,
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becomes a prime example of how multilateral Western and Russian
help could jointly ease tensions in potential future hot spots.
Moreover, the threat here is not Islam, as such; political Islam
(the idea that the religious authorities and political
authorities should be the same or closely connected) has no
answer to Muslim civilization's present crisis. Rather political
Islam is a cry of despair over the failure of other alternatives.
Therefore we should not adopt policies that intensify the chances
for Western failure in Central Asia by not offering even a
minimum economic program of reconstruction.
Two conclusions flow from this. First, it is in everyone's
interest that Moscow and Washington help Central Asian states
reach full economic sovereignty and development. U.S. support
for Muscovite economic domination of local economies and energy
industry through its pipelines sends Moscow the wrong signal
regarding Russian imperial proclivities and tempts Moscow into
unaffordable engagements. That outcome will profoundly disturb
the whole region.
Nor will Russian domination contribute to the flowering of
market economics and democracy in these states. Rather that kind
of domination integrates them as backward dependencies into a
Moscow-centric economic system where Moscow has every reason to
continue supporting Central Asian authoritarianism. That makes
Central Asia once again a center of instability and the object of
strong international rivalries. Since Central Asia is
increasingly important to China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and
India, a Moscow-oriented policy also weakens possibilities for a
broader Asian security system.
The second conclusion follows from this first one. Iran's
ability to threaten Moscow's or Washington's vital interests here
is steadily declining. Tehran is actually in retreat in the
Middle East and faces daunting domestic problems. U.S. policy in
Central Asia should not be based on an Iranian threat but rather
141
address real issues like economic reconstruction.
That is
where all foreign efforts should go. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), behind which stands the West, has recommended a
single package for Central Asia much like the one it recommended
142
with disastrous results for Russia.
This will not save Central
Asia from an economic catastrophe. Instead, following the IMF
plan will lead them into deeper dependence on Russia and shatter
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economic-political stability in Central Asia. Rather, it is
imperative that the Central Asian states trade freely with
whomever they want and sell and ship their oil as they please.
In that manner they can avoid undue dependence on any one state.
There are several reasons for this. First, if foreigners
are excluded, Central Asians will have to rely on antiquated,
backward, and inadequate Russian infrastructure for their energy
production, extraction, and transportation that will only further
143
blight the already blasted Central Asian ecology.
Western and
Japanese technology, on the other hand, offers much more
ecological promise and is more economical. Second, it is in the
West's interests to diversify oil suppliers, adding downward
pressure on oil prices and blocking Russian imperial temptations.
That policy might move Russia to reform its antiquated and
crisis-plagued energy economy rather than trying to avert the
144
needed structural reforms as has been the case until now.
Only
Central Asian revenues and a lack of competition enables Russia's
energy industry to carry on its ruinous course and avoid the
needed reforms.
By fostering Central Asia's gradual but genuine integration
with the West, the United States can help it overcome its
problems and adopt rational and beneficial economic policies that
create real conditions for the political reforms we seek. One
rational step would be for Central Asia to deepen its ties with
the ECO despite the former internal Turco-Iranian rivalry there.
The ECO offers a Persian Gulf alternative to Russian trading
routes. The ECO could help efficiently exchange Iranian refined
oil for Central Asia's electricity surplus and local
infrastructural improvement. Local manufacturers and producers
of consumer goods should benefit from a larger market with
greater ability to market their product. And the ECO could
usefully discuss regional and transnational cooperation in
145
economics, ecology, and even security.
Promoting Central Asian regional integration, sustained
economic reform, and economic growth meets local needs and
interests. Regional cooperation blocks Russian neo-imperialism,
diverts Russian energies to more cooperative avenues, and aids
Russian democratic reforms. Policies encouraging neo-imperialism
in Central Asia help neither Russia, Central Asia, nor the United
States. Regional integration also hinders Iran from maximizing a
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negative influence when the inevitable crisis appears. It also
prevents any one power from feeling aggrieved or threatened by
local developments since all will benefit. Economic advancement
undercuts fundamentalist appeals that are based on
modernization's failures to date in the Muslim world. U.S.
promotion of regional cooperation strengthens our calls for
political reform because we then join with developing indigenous
forces who demand reform and a devolution of power. And lastly,
promoting such ventures creates a local balance that deters a new
great game and rivalry among other states.
Though these are not vital U.S. interests, they are vital
for local and adjoining states, none of whom alone can contest
Russia's imperial thrust. But that thrust cannot remedy either
local conditions or Russia's weakness. Rather, Russia's imperial
drive compounds both problems. While Central Asia itself may not
be seen to be vital to the United States, the explosion that will
ensue if we abandon the region to Moscow will spare nobody from
its wrath.
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